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Quite predictably, stories surrounding scandals
about money in politics keep resurfacing in the
headlines of newspapers. In 2009, for example, two
peers were suspended from the House of Lords for
six months after being accused of offering favors for
cash.A Lords committee found them guilty of being
willing to change laws in exchange for cash.Another
example comes from the US,where in 2005 Represen-
tative Randy “Duke” Cunningham pled guilty to bri-
bery and resigned from office. Cunningham had sold
his house to a defense contractor for USD 1.6 million,
at which point the contractor immediately sold the
house again for a loss of USD 700,000.The transaction
was said to be payback for Cunningham,who had pre-
viously influenced the awarding of a Pentagon con-
tract in favor of the contractor.Obviously the question
arises whether these anecdotes are merely stories of a
few renegade legislators who broke campaign finance
laws, or whether these stories represent just the tip of
the iceberg of a corrupt system in which contributors
and legislators exchange money for political favors.
In the US, concern about the influence of special
interests on politics,through the vehicle of campaign
contributions, is amplified by the rapid rise in the
campaign expenditures of candidates running for of-
fice.The rising campaign expenditures are especially
noteworthy in US presidential campaigns. While
President Bill Clinton and Republican challenger
Senator Robert Dole spent USD 80 million altogeth-
er in 1996,just four years later,candidates George W.
Bush and Albert Gore spent USD 307 million cam-
paigning for the presidency. By 2004 the expenditures
of Senator John Kerry, the opponent of incumbent
Bush, amounted to more than USD 550 million and
in the 2008 election, Democrat Barack Obama and
Republican John McCain spent over USD 1.1 billion
on their election campaigns.And it is all but certain
that these record amounts will be easily surpassed in
the 2012 election.
The topic of campaign contributions and campaign
spending has received new scrutiny since the 2010 US
Supreme Court decision Citizens United v Federal
Election Commission (130 S.Ct. 876, 2010), which al-
lows corporations and unions to spend unlimited sums
on advocating the election – or the defeat – of a can-
didate.The Citizens United decision was so controver-
sial that President Obama explicitly criticized the Su-
preme Court justices about this landmark decision
during his 2010 State of the Union address.
Theory is useful in helping us examine under what
conditions political favors are granted in return for
campaign contributions (for example,Grossman and
Helpman 1994,Austen-Smith 1987,Coate 2004).How-
ever, depending on the assumptions in the models,
theory can also lead to conflicting predictions re-
garding the role of money in politics.Theoretical pre-
dictions about the effect of contributions on policy
are very sensitive to assumptions about the objec-
tives of candidates, whether their positions are im-
movable or not,to what extent the voters are ration-
al,the type of electoral competition and electoral in-
stitutions, the goals of contributors, and the role of
advertising in inducing voters to change their voting
behavior, and to what extent voters can punish can-
didates for not following their platforms.
One of the perhaps oldest lines of research in the
area of campaign contributions and special political
favors is the examination of the effect of campaign
contributions on voting behavior. Academic work
started out by analyzing the influence of campaign
contributions on policy decisions by correlating cam-
paign contributions with the voting record of legisla-
tors.This research agenda faces several challenges.One
is that of causation. Do contributions cause changes in
voting behavior or do contributions simply reflect
the policy positions held by legislators? In the latter
case, a positive correlation between contributions
and voting for the contributor’s interest merely re- * George Mason University, Fairfax.flects that the contributor donated money to those
who have the same policy positions as the con-
tributor.
Some studies address the causation issue using instru-
mental variable methods. But both studies – those
that address the causality issue via instrumental vari-
ables and those that do not explicitly address this is-
sue – have found mixed evidence for the hypothesis
that contributions have a corruptive effect on voting
behavior in the legislature (Ansolabehere et al.2003).
A meta analysis of a large number of studies on these
issues has found, however, that contributions influ-
ence legislative voting behavior (Stratmann 2005).
Nonetheless, the mixed findings suggest that legisla-
tive voting behavior is not primarily determined by
special interest contributions. Especially on issues
that are visible to the public and where the public
has an interest in the issue, such as abortion legisla-
tion or gun control, money has probably little influ-
ence on legislative voting behavior and especially
here, the interested parties give to those politicians
who they know will support their cause.When voters
are aware of an issue, and thus closely monitor their
representatives, contributions are unlikely to affect
anything as visible as a vote in a legislature.An effect
of money on voting behavior is more likely to be
found with issues that are not of high salience to vot-
ers. Further, it would be advisable to look at issues
where the benefits of the decision are concentrated
and costs disbursed.When the costs of decisions are
disbursed, voters face a weaker incentive to monitor
their representatives.
One way of overcoming the nagging causation issue
– that the allocation of campaign contributions may
simply reflect legislators’ positions – is to hold repre-
sentatives’ positions constant, and examine whether
they alter their vote for or against special interests
when they receive higher or lower contributions from
these interest groups. Stratmann (2002) does so by
examining votes on financial services legislation. Fi-
nancial services legislation is an issue of relatively
low salience, especially prior to the financial melt-
down in 2008, and an issue area where voters do not
necessarily closely monitor how their representative
votes. Stratmann (2002) investigated the repeal of
the Glass-Steagall Act, which separated commercial
banking from investment banking.He identified two
nearly identical bills, one from 1992 and one from
1998,to repeal this act.US House representatives had
voted on the repeal of this act in those years.Banking
interests favored the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act,
while investment banks and insurance companies
opposed it. Between 1992 and 1998 some legislators
received an increase (or decrease) in contributions
from the special interests favoring or opposing the
repeal of the act. The results of the study show that
legislators who received an increase in banking con-
tributions from the time the first vote was cast to the
time the second vote was cast had a higher probabil-
ity of favoring banking interests on the second vote
than on the first. And representatives who received
an increase in contributions from insurance and in-
vestment bank interests were more likely to oppose
the repeal of the act in 1998 than in 1992.
But voting is only one dimension of legislative work.
Voting is studied because it is easily observable, but
also because it is the best measure of interest group
influence. Other aspects, not as easily observable as
voting, such as talking to bureaucrats, spending time
advancing the agenda of special interests behind closed
doors, and inserting specific language into bills, are
clearly important and because they are less likely to
be observed by voters,it may be in this area that mon-
ey has the largest influence on politics.
Money donated to advocate the election or defeat
of a candidate is different from contributing to the
candidate.While the winning candidate may be grate-
ful to the corporation that advocated defeat of his
opponent, a direct quid pro quo may be less likely 
if the corporation gives the money directly to the
politician.
Another approach for testing the importance of con-
tributions is to link contributions to stock market per-
formance.Scholars have started to examine the effect
of corporate campaign contributions on the fortunes
of the contributing firms. These works include an in-
teresting study by Jayachandran (2006). Using the
unexpected departure of Senator Jim Jeffords from
the Republican Party in May 2001, which resulted in
a shift in the Senate majority,Jayachandran examined
the effect of this change on the market value of firms
contributing soft money to the Republican and De-
mocratic parties. It was shown that in the week after
Jeffords left the Republican Party, firms lost 0.8 per-
cent of market capitalization for every USD 250,000
contributed to Republicans. The stock price gain to
firms with Democratic contributions was smaller,
but not statistically different in magnitude. Cooper,
Gulen and Ovtchinnikov (2010) studied stock-market
returns for companies that gave contributions and
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found that a firm’s future stock returns increased with
the number of candidates the firm supported for po-
litical office. The authors report that this effect was
particularly strong when a firm supported candidates
in its own home state, candidates in House races, and
Democratic Party candidates.
Discussions about money in politics often center on
the tension between providing information and cor-
ruption.Independent expenditures and expenditures
by candidates can provide voters with the necessary
information to cast an informed vote at the ballot
box.On the other hand,politicians may engage in an
explicit or implicit quid pro quo for contributions
received or for independent expenditures that advo-
cated their election.
According to the US Supreme Court, the main justi-
fication for capping contributions is that large con-
tributions may result in corruption. More specifical-
ly, that the incumbent will hand out favors to the
contributor.For the court,one argument that weighs
against the capping of contributions is that contribu-
tions are a form of speech, and free speech is pro-
tected by the US constitution.
Before thinking from an economic perspective about
whether contributions should be capped, it is neces-
sary to consider benefits and cost of contributions,
regardless of whether or not the constitution justifies
the capping of contributions. Campaign contribu-
tions help candidates to finance their election cam-
paigns and to advertise their positions. Thus cam-
paign spending, fueled by campaign contributions,
provides information to voters. With this informa-
tion, voters can infer which candidate is most closely
aligned with their own policy positions and subse-
quently cast appropriate votes. Having more infor-
mation may also increase turnout, and thus partici-
pation, in the election. With adequate disclosure of
who contributed to candidates, voters also receive
information about who supports the candidate, and
this may help voters to make inferences about can-
didate positions.For example,if a candidate receives
large contributions from the gun control lobby, this
may indicate that that the candidate favors gun con-
trol. Although there are some informational gains
from campaign spending,some of these gains may be
lost if voters believe that the candidate has accepted
contributions for future favors. In this case turnout
may be lower than it would be otherwise (Houser,
Morton and Stratmann 2011).
One concern regarding the capping of contributions
is that caps are an incumbent protection device.Since
incumbents have an advantage over challengers be-
cause they have the power of their office, connec-
tions and receive free press coverage, challengers
have to raise large sums to be competitive in a race.
Because of the lack of connections, challengers may
rely on only a handful of large contributors and
by capping contributions, challengers cannot raise
enough money to defeat an incumbent.
In particular, capping contributions too low may
have adverse effects. If limits were set to zero, in a
private campaign financing system, challengers
could not rely on contributors for the financing of
campaigns. While the same is true for incumbents,
they, however, have the power of their office to ad-
vertise for themselves and receive free coverage by
the media. Thus very low contribution limits could
tilt the competitive advantage more towards the in-
cumbent.In fact the US Supreme Court struck down
a Vermont law which set the contribution cap at
USD 200 per person because the court thought that
the caps were too low, potentially leading to uncom-
petitive elections because challengers cannot mount
a viable campaign.
However, the concern that low contribution limits
lead to uncompetitive elections may not be justi-
fied. A recent study for the American states exam-
ined whether contribution limits of USD 500 and
below have uncompetitive effects (Stratmann 2010).
That study showed that low limits do not have un-
competitive effects, and that states with limits of
USD 500 and below have more competitive elec-
tions in races to state assemblies relative to states
with contribution limits of USD 1,000 or higher.
Thus this study suggests that some caps can reduce
the incumbency advantage. One explanation for
this finding is that contribution caps primarily ad-
versely affect the fundraising ability of incumbents,
pulling them down closer to the fundraising capaci-
ty of challengers.
But the consequences of caps of more than that may
limit corruption and, at least over some range, re-
duce the incumbency advantage.This is because vot-
ers obtain information through campaign spending,
and campaign advertising allows voters to make a
more informed choice.Contribution caps can lead to
lower campaign spending and thus capping contribu-
tions may limit the information flow to voters, lead-
ing voters to make suboptimal choices.Besides capping contributions,some have advocated
the capping of campaign expenditures of candidates.
The US Supreme Court, however, struck down such
expenditure limits because they considered this an
inappropriate curtailment of free speech. From an
economic perspective,expenditure limits could be ef-
ficiency-enhancing if campaign spending is a zero
sum game, and all that expenditures do is to offset
each other.However,expenditures may serve as use-
ful signals to the candidate’s ability because high
quality candidates may be able to attract more con-
tributions. Specifically, if those candidates who pro-
pose the most efficient policies receive the most con-
tributions,then by observing the size of the expendi-
tures voters are informed about which of the candi-
dates has the most efficient policies.That being said,
it should be noted that although the idea that candi-
dates with the best policies receive the most contri-
butions is interesting, this hypothesis has not yet
been tested.
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